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MISHAP OR CRISIS? THE APARTHEID ECONOMY'S RECENT RECORD
IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
"The last few years were among the most difficult
we have experienced and called for sacrifices by
one and all. But that those sacrifices were worth
it is clear now: the economic tide has turned
towards growth and development and we can justifi-
ably look ahead with new confidence.'1^
"... overpowering economic and political forces
[have] combined to produce a comprehensive struc-
tural crisis for the apartheid economy... That
there is no hope for the apartheid economy is now
no longer in question."£
Introduction
The South African economy has performed poorly in recent
years. One line of interpretation views this poor perfor-
mance as a severe and unfortunate cyclical downswing from
which the economy is slowly recovering. Another by contrast
regards it as symptomatic of an economic crisis; many
variations between these views can be found. This is of
course an ideologically-loaded issue since the 'mishap'
position is associated with the South African government and
the 'crisis' view with its left-wing opponents who foresee
national economic recovery only once significant economic
and political restructuring of society has taken place.
I shall begin by describing the recent economic record of
South Africa in its post-War context, and draw out some
causes of the current decline. I will then consider whether
the causes of decline are temporary/cyclical or long-term,
whether they are likely to weaken or worsen, and how the
decline as a whole should be characterised.
The South African Economy since World War II
To understand the economic prospects of South Africa, it is
useful to examine its overall record since the Second World
War.^ From the 1940s until 1974, an increasingly open and
buoyant world economy with high demand for South African raw
materials created ideal conditions for steady growth in the
real Gross Domestic Product averaging almost five per cent
per annum. Foreign exchange earned was used to import
capital equipment and build up local manufacturing and
technology behind tariff barriers. In the social sphere,
vigorous state policies were designed to disorganise African
workers and keep African wage levels low. While all sectors
of the South African economy grew over this period, three
overall tendencies were particularly significant:
Firstly, agriculture and mining, the foreign exchange-
earning sectors of the economy, grew relatively slowly.
Their shares of real output fell slightly, and of employment
more quickly (with an absolute fall in agricultural employ-
ment) . Secondly, the other goods-producing sectors
(manufacturing, electricity, and construction) grew more
rapidly than the economy as a whole, and their shares of
employment also rose. Thirdly, output and employment in the
tertiary sectors (especially government) grew steadily, with
employment probably contracting only in the personal ser-
vices sector (led by domestic service).
There has been a steady slowdown in rates of economic growth
since 1974; real GDP growth rates have fallen to 1.5 per
cent in the 1980s (see Graph 1).4 Growth rates have dimin-
ished unevenly through the economy, however. Due to rising
and erratic world gold prices, mining earnings have boomed,
while agriculture and manufacturing have struggled; since
1982, real manufacturing output and employment have been
growing more slowly than in the economy as a whole. The
tertiary sector has continued growing, led chiefly by
government. Growth rates of formal jobs over the business
cycle peaked in the 1960s and have been falling since (see
below).
Three Determinants of Economic Development in South Africa
Three central determinants of South Africa's economic record
can be identified: the balance of payments, the performance
of the manufacturing sector, and the employment situation.
Firstly, the balance of payments has always been a potential
constraint on growth in South Africa. Compared to most
developing countries however. South Africa has an unusually
promising balance of payments situation. The usual pattern
is of a trade surplus produced by raw materials (agriculture
and mining) exports, much of which is 'consumed1 by indus-
trial sectors being net users of foreign exchange, and large
deficits on invisibles (interest payments, royalties, etc.).
Capital inflows attracted by high profit rates have also
been an intermittent source of investment funds and foreign
exchange.
On the exports side. South Africa's position has not changed
much post-War. South Africa exports have always comprised
mainly raw materials, a small number of which come to a high
share of total exports; the mining share in merchandise
exports has averaged over 60 per cent. In imports terms,
South Africa has been largely self-sufficient in consumer
goods since the 1950s. The share of imported capital goods
has risen since 1945, however, with machinery and transport
equipment, for example, reaching 49 per cent of the imports
Graphs Three Growth Indicators for South Africa,
1947-1986
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Graphs are 3-year moving averages. Real output (1975
prices) data are calculated from South African Reserve
Bank sources, reworked as described in my 'Best Laager1
(see footnote 3). Sectors covered for employment are
mining, manufacturing, construction, electricity, com-
merce, transport and government services; this data is
unreliable before the 1960s. Important omissions are
agriculture and most business and private services.
total in 1985. Hence, although South Africa has built up a
capital-goods industry, the strong historical value of the
rand permitted imported machinery to form a high proportion
of capital goods used. As a result, balance of payments
deficits have always tended to bite during boom periods in
South Africa, with imports rising sharply, necessitating an
eventual economic clampdown and monetary contraction.^
After 1971, the international gold price (which had been
nominally constant in US dollars and falling in real terms
since 1949), began rising, albeit erratically. This boosted
mining revenues, eased South Africa's balance of payments
constraint, and implied potentially higher domestic output
growth rates if the extra income were to be used produc-
tively. The gold 'bonanza' was squandered however, and not
used to extend South Africa's productive capacity signifi-
cantly.£ So, when the gold price fell in the 1980s, the
economy~suffered immediately, with an exchange rate under
pressure, a weakened manufacturing sector, and high foreign
debts.
The vulnerability of South Africa's balance of payments is
revealed in two main areas. Firstly, her current account is
reliant on raw material exports and imports of manufactures.
Non-gold net barter terms of trade - the ratio of export
prices to import prices - remain stable during international
booms but deteriorate during slumps. Further, her export
earnings tend to be erratic, dependent on variable inter-
national raw material prices and agricultural fluctuations.
Gold was a stabilizing factor until the early 1970s but real
gold earnings have fluctuated wildly since - though on an
upward long-run trend.
Secondly, the trade and capital accounts of the South
African balance of payments have been opened up since the
later 197 0s, with state moves towards a 'market-oriented
monetary strategy' including financial deregulation, more
variable and erratic interest rates, a more open balance of
payments designed to encourage international trade and capi-
tal flows, and a floating and fluctuating exchange rate.
This had two important effects: South African banks and the
state raised foreign loans at (then) low real interest rates
which had to be repaid at much higher real rates, and
allowed a significant role for destabilising short-term
capital flows. These have rendered the South African econ-
omy, balance of payments and foreign exchange situation more
vulnerable to vicissitudes in the international economy in
the 1980s, and also make it an easier target for sanctions.
A second important determinant of the long-run prosperity of
the South African economy - as in any developing country -
is the vitality of her manufacturing sector.7 South African
real manufacturing output grew rapidly in "the 1950s and
1960s, growth rates averaging over seven per cent per annum
(see Graph 2 above). There were several reasons for these
high growth rates: buoyant international demand and stable
terms of trade, an active state import-substitution policy
and intervention in strategic economic sectors, cheap raw
material and electricity inputs, capital controls compelling
higher levels of local investment, and low black wages.
The record has negative aspects, however- The import-
substitution programme combined with the strong currency led
to a failure to export. International non-competitiveness
of local production was accordingly entrenched via failure
to achieve economies of scale and compete on international
markets. Likewise, the industrial sector came to rely on
protection and ever-more-advanced machinery imports, without
achieving the full learning effects of producing a variety
of capital goods for local use and for export.8
Real manufacturing import levels as percentage of GDP failed
to fall over the years, as South Africa moved 'up' the
imports scale, requiring increased inputs of imported
machinery, transport equipment and technology to keep indus-
try going. The 'easy' stage of import substitution in local
consumer goods, some durables and simpler machinery was
basically complete by the early 1970s, with further scope
for import-replacement limited to capital and intermediate
goods and high-technology sectors.
In the 1970s, manufacturing growth began to slow down and
rather half-hearted government efforts at stimulating
exports and the processing of primary products have not been
effective. The recent record has been particularly poor;
according to the South African Reserve Bank, manufacturing
volume of production in November 1987 was 5.7 per cent below
its 1981 peak. Manufacturing has begun to contract relative
to other sectors (its share of nominal GDP fell from a high
of 23.7 per cent in 1981 to 21.8 per cent in 1986), with
inefficiencies and a limited internal market restricting
local sales, and a strong exchange rate of the rand (until
1984) and trade sanctions limiting export growth. This poor
manufacturing position implies slower future growth rates
for the economy as a whole.
Thirdly, a major indicator of the health of any economy is
the extent to which it can provide employment and incomes to
its labour force. South Africa's performance was impressive
in these terms until the early 1970s. Employment in most of
the formal, high-productivity sectors of the economy grew
steadily, with employment growth rates of 3.3 per cent per
annum between 1964 and 1974 in those sectors for which more
reliable official data is available (see Graph 3). African
open unemployment rates seem not to have risen in the 1960s.
Since then, the position has deteriorated drastically. For-
mal employment growth rates have fallen sharply in the past
ten years, averaging only about one per cent per annum over
the 1980-1984 cycle. African population and labour force
growth rates have remained high, leading to a large and con-
tinually expanding pool of labour which is 'surplus1 to the
needs of the modern sector of the economy.9
To make the situation worse, the tendency since about 1970
has been for industrial firms to respond to growing demand
by increasing capital use and labour productivity levels
rather than employment.10 This tendency is particularly
noticeable in manufacturing where real output and employment
growth rates averaged 2.1 per cent per annum and only 0.4
per cent per annum respectively over the 1974-1987 period.
In other sectors the employment outlook is also bleak. Com-
mercial agriculture has been mechanising and shedding labour
since the 1960s, the mining sector cannot be relied on to
greatly expand employment, and construction employment seems
fairly stagnant. Commerce and private services not driven
by a dynamic goods sector of the economy are unlikely to
grow rapidly and raise worker incomes much. Rising govern-
ment employment, on the other hand, is often of entirely
unproductive bureaucrats, and constrained by a weak state
fiscal position.
Together, these employment trends have important implica-
tions. Unemployment and underemployment are likely to rise
rapidly in the foreseeable future as a rapidly-growing
labour force encounters a stagnant employment position in
the economy. Increasing economic and social differentiation
may emerge within the labour force between people in high-
productivity higher-income jobs and the unemployed or under-
employed. The services will be the main source of employ-
ment growth, led by trade, transport and personal services,
stimulated partly by government efforts at deregulation and
informal sector development, and partly by the informal
sector's usual urban 'safety net1 role.^1 Such jobs are
likely to be poor and lack significant output-boosting
effect on the broader economy, and the share in total
employment of low-productivity, low-income casual workers
and the self-employed will probably rise further.
Mishap or Crisis?
Various causes of South Africa's economic decline since
about 1974 have been discussed above. Perhaps most impor-
tantly, the advanced capitalist countries have been growing
slowly since the early 1970s and closely-linked eocnomies
like South Africa have slowed down too. Compared to a
sample of 18 'similar' developing countries like Turkey,
Brazil and Algeria, South Africa's unimpressive growth rank-
ing of twelfth 1950-70 fell only marginally to thirteenth
1970-8512^ - suggesting that the long-term local slowdown is
largely externally induced. More recent cyclical vicissi-
tudes in the world economy have forced many developing
economies with structural similarities to South Africa to
adjust to factors like falling raw materials prices, high
interest payments on foreign debt and short-term capital
outflows. Some Latin American countries for example suf-
fered far more from these adjustments than South Africa;
over the crucial 1981-1985 period, South Africa grew at
around one per cent per annum, compared to disaster in coun-
tries like Argentina (-2.1 per cent per annum) and Venezuela
(-1.3 per cent per annum).13
The South African economy has in fact adjusted relatively
quickly to these 'external1 constraints and most of its
short-run weaknesses are under control. As of early 1988,
inflation rates were falling, the real exchange rate of the
rand had recovered somewhat from its 1984-85 slump, foreign
debts were steadily being paid off (using large current
account surpluses of the balance of payments), and signs of
recovery were evident in some sectors. Further, state
macroeconomic policy has begun turning away from the suici-
dal austerity policies of 1984-85, and the economy has begun
making structural adaptations such that it should be less
exposed to future changes in world economic conditions.
The most immediate danger is still the vulnerability of the
balance of payments, but gold, uranium and coal exports will
continue to provide valuable foreign exchange, and more cun-
ning state balance of payments policy could enable the
economy to benefit more from these earnings than in the
recent past. This would especially be the case when the
bulk of foreign debts have been paid off, reducing the
necessity for large balance of payments surpluses, and
inflation is seen as being under control.
To a significant extent, then, the poor economic performance
of 1981-1986 can be seen as a 'mishap', as induced by an
unfortunate coincidence of events which is unlikely to be
repeated. But this is not the whole story. While the mag-
nitude of the recent slump was magnified by external
factors, the South African economy has been on a low-growth
development path since the mid-1970s.
Evidence of overall economic recovery should also be treated
with scepticism. The South African economy has endured such
a severe slump recently that the increase in demand accom-
panying the current 'mini-boom' is raising output and
employment and investment levels are partially recovering
from the doldrums. However, such expansion is likely to be
cut short due to the slow growth of aggregate productive
capacity in the 1980s.^4 Extrapolating recent economic
trends in South Africa, it seems unlikely that total output
will grow faster than perhaps two per cent per annum over
the next decade, and real incomes per capita are likely to
fall steadily. Growth projections for the 1986-1990 period
of 3.2 or 3.3 per cent per annuml£ seem quite unrealisti-
cally high.
Further, there are indications that the current political
situation is having a particularly negative effect on the
South African economy, on a scale not hitherto experienced.
Two major political-economic connections can be hypothesised
in South Africa. Firstly, political 'unrest' tends to lower
investment levels and induce capital flight and balance of
payments crises, leading to deflationary macroeconomic poli-
cies, and slower economic growth.1£ The logic seems simple:
investors fear profits will be undermined by continual
political struggle, with the added danger of possible even-
tual expropriation or nationalization of their capital under
a radical government. To this can be added pressures on
foreign firms operating in South Africa due to anti-
apartheid feeling in the West. Thus, real economy-wide
growth rates of fixed capital stock of around 6.8 per cent
per annum 1969-1974 slowed to 3.3 per cent per annum 1980-86
- a period in which the capital:output ratio rose by around
two per cent per annum and is likely to increase in the
future. This decline is even more noticeable in manufactur-
ing, with a comparable annual drop from 8.3 per cent to 3.3
per cent.
These patterns have been particularly noticeable in South
Africa since the 1984/85 stage of Black resistance. The
capital account of the balance of payments suffered first,
while real gross domestic fixed investment has fallen
steadily since a peak in 1981 (halving in manufacturing by
1986), and real net domestic investment by private firms in
1985 and 1986 was negative for the first time in 50 years,
though recovered slightly in 1987.17
The second political-economic connection concerns the
apartheid system itself. In the early post-War period,
apartheid aided aspects of economic growth in South Africa.
Its fiscal costs were low and it encouraged rapid capital
accumulation by ensuring a cheap unskilled labour supply for
White firms. By the late 1960s this position had begun
changing. The production pattern in the economy was moving
towards higher-wage skill- and capital-intensive sectors
which are less dependent for survival on cheap unskilled
Black labour, and the labour controls they suffered pre-
vented the dissemination of skills and hampered productivity
growth.
At the same time, the recent fiscal costs of apartheid have
soared in areas like defence, homelands and administra-
tion.JJ3 The net effect of these processes is that the total
financial costs of apartheid are rising steadily in a period
when the state can ill afford them, thus compelling it to
raise taxes or loans to cover spending or reduce expenditure
in other areas. This perhaps irreversible combination of
falling benefits and rising costs of apartheid over an
extended period of time is unique to the current phase of
South African history.19
The long-term prospects of the South African economy under
the present regime are also unpromising. For a developing
country, the structure of the economy is not healthy - most
noticeable in the weak manufacturing sector, in South
Africa's appalling recent job-creation record, in a weak
state financial position (affecting investment in
infrastructure and parastatals), and in the relatively poor
performance of employment-creating small-scale manufacturing
and services over the past few years. Meanwhile, the world
economy is growing only slowly and has begun moving away
from some of South Africa's raw material exports. South
Africa will attempt to export manufactures but faces stiff
competition from other newly industrialising countries and
may be hamstrung by looming trade sanctions. Further,
foreign capital and finance is increasingly suspicious of
the South African situation, and South Africa will be forced
to survive largely without new inflows of foreign capital.
This is likely to reduce the long-run growth rate by at
least two per cent per annum, especially if accompanied by
diminished access to foreign technology and skills.20
In short, neither of the 'mishap or crisis' positions quoted
initially seems correct. The South African economy is in a
bad way, suffering what may be termed a secular recession,
and prospects for sustained economic recovery are not good.
This is more than a temporary or cyclical mishap. Is it in
economic crisis? Where crisis is defined simply as "long
run economic decline"^ the answer is clearly yes. It
implies however that most of the world economy has been in
crisis for fifteen years and the usefulness and local speci-
ficity of such a definition seems minimal.
By contrast, Wright suggests economic crisis "implies that
in order for accumulation to continue some sort of restruc-
turing of the accumulation process is necessary".22 While
marginal forms of economic restructuring are taking place
all the time, this does not yet seem appropriate for South
Africa. The economic basis of white rule, while weakening
slowly, will certainly be able to provide comfortable
incomes for most whites and support a huge military-
apartheid apparatus for a long time yet. The economy has
certain strengths - a strong food-producing sector, valuable
mineral resources, a limited dependence on oil, a fairly
developed manufacturing sector, some local technological
knowhow, and fair levels of local savings - which will
enable it certainly to survive and grow slowly as long as
effective large-scale trade sanctions are not applied.
Towards a Laager Economy?
The South African economy is weakening but its resilience
and capacity to adjust to changed circumstances should not
be underestimated. Indeed, this could be put to the test
over the next few years. Under the impact of sanctions and
external vulnerability, there have been moves amongst South
African economic policymakers towards a 'laager economy1
option: reducing economic links with the outside world and
attempting to become more economically self-sufficient - and
hence freer from outside political pressures,2_3 This makes
a virtue of necessity for South Africa can no longer depend
on foreign capital inflows and some trade links are threat-
ened. Instead, the local manufacturing sector will be
relied on to provide the necessary machinery, capital goods
and technology to keep the economy and military establish-
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ment functioning, perhaps with higher parastatal spending or
vigorous investment incentives to raise investment in vital
manufacturing subsectors.
The laager direction would further entrench economic decline
in South Africa. 2A Most obviously, inefficiency and clumsy
government intervention in the economy would be perpetuated,
raising production costs and lowering output growth rates
across the economy. In some industrial sectors, capital-
intensive methods of production would be further entrenched,
and dependence on erratic mining revenues would remain.
Corresponding to this would be low rates of formal job-
creation and steadily rising unemployment in all sectors and
regions of South Africa, and generally falling real incomes.
This 'backs-to-the-wall' option could have ominous political
implications. Among whites, a lengthy period of economic
decline, with White morale bolstered by nationalism, anti-
Communist feeling and state propaganda might strengthen
conservative groups and weaken the position of those who
want to see an end to the system of white political
supremacy. Such an economic and political environment could
render progressive political organisation among blacks even
more difficult than at present. In the absence of major new
political initiatives however, the resilience of the South
African economy could allow such a situation to be perpetu-
ated for many years.
Finally, the longer, more torturous and economically
destructive the path towards Black majority rule, the weaker
the economy will be at its end, and the greater the economic
constraints on any post-apartheid government which would
like to attempt policies of income and wealth redistribu-
tion. The manufacturing sector will likely be diversified
but inefficient and heavily subsidized, export markets will
have been permanently lost, South Africa's position in the
world economy will have drastically deteriorated, and
savings and investment levels will be low. Perhaps most
importantly, South Africa will have a huge number of poor
and unemployed people, with little hope of providing them
with reasonably paid work for many years. Any post-
apartheid efforts at socialism may be subsumed beneath the
urgent immediate need to reconstruct the economy and create
jobs.
Admittedly, the rest of the world would rejoice to see
apartheid ended and aid might be made available, lower
levels of unproductive state spending might free funds for
investment and income redistribution, and the ending of
trade and investment restrictions would allow a more aggres-
sive South African export strategy, and lower costs of capi-
tal imports. The Zimbabwean experience, however, indicates
that outside assistance is not to be relied upon.2_5 There
is a danger, then, that current policies to undermine the
11
South African economy could have multiplied negative effects
on the socio-political system that replaces apartheid.
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